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Intentions, Commitments, and the Derivation of Implicatures

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dc.rights.license CC BY eng
dc.contributor.author Drobňák, Matej cze
dc.date.accessioned 2025-12-05T14:40:43Z
dc.date.available 2025-12-05T14:40:43Z
dc.date.issued 2024 eng
dc.identifier.issn 1335-0668 eng
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12603/2185
dc.description.abstract In this paper, I focus on a common equivocality in how the content of conversational, especially scalar, implicatures is specified and I argue that there is a substantial difference between the belief specification BELS(¬ψ) (“The speaker believes that ¬ψ”) and the content specification ¬ψ. The main argument for taking the distinction between the specifications seriously is that, in most cases, both BELS(¬ψ) and ¬ψ can be derived as the implicatures of the same sentence but they have different consequences for how the hearer plans her future actions and manages expectations about the future actions of the speaker. As I argue further, the commitment-based approaches can provide an explanation of how the content specification is derived in contexts in which the speaker does not have beliefs required for the derivation of the belief specification and because of that they have an advantage over the standard Gricean approach. © The Author. Journal compilation © The Editorial Board, Organon F. eng
dc.format p. 203-215 eng
dc.language.iso eng eng
dc.publisher Slovenská akadémia vied. Filozofický ústav eng
dc.relation.ispartof Organon F : filozofický časopis, volume 31, issue: 3 eng
dc.subject Commitments eng
dc.subject Gricean pragmatics eng
dc.subject implicatures eng
dc.subject intentions eng
dc.subject social-normative pragmatics eng
dc.title Intentions, Commitments, and the Derivation of Implicatures eng
dc.type article eng
dc.identifier.obd 43881316 eng
dc.identifier.doi 10.31577/orgf.2024.31301 eng
dc.publicationstatus postprint eng
dc.peerreviewed yes eng
dc.source.url https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2024.31301 cze
dc.relation.publisherversion https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2024.31301 eng
dc.rights.access Open Access eng
dc.project.ID GN22-05200O/Naturalizovaný inferencializmus: Krok směrem k sociálně-normativní pragmatice eng


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